INTRODUCTION
The relationship between consent, promise of marriage and criminal liability has always been a difficult area of Indian criminal law. Courts have repeatedly faced cases where two adults enter into a relationship, maintain a physical relationship for a considerable period and later, after the relationship breaks down, one party alleges that consent was obtained through a false promise of marriage.
The introduction of Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) has given this issue a separate statutory framework. Section 69 deals with sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means or by making a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling that promise, where the act does not amount to rape. The punishment may extend to ten years' imprisonment and fine. The provision also explains that "deceitful means" includes inducement for employment or promotion, a false promise of employment or promotion, or marrying by suppressing identity.
The central difficulty, however, remains the same: when does a promise to marry become a criminal false promise and when is it merely a genuine promise which was later not fulfilled?
The decision in Kumar Rishiraj v. State of Bihar, decided by the Patna High Court on 20 January 2025, is useful in understanding this question. Although the case was decided under the Indian Penal Code and therefore was not a Section 69 BNS prosecution, the Court considered a relationship that had continued for several years and rejected the attempt to treat the entire relationship as rape merely because marriage had not ultimately taken place.
UNDERSTANDING SECTION 69 BNS
Section 69 is one of the new provisions introduced by the BNS. It specifically criminalises sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or through a promise to marry made without an intention to fulfil it, provided the conduct does not amount to rape. The punishment may extend to ten years and fine.
The wording of the provision is important. It does not say that every person who promises marriage and later refuses to marry commits an offence. The crucial words are "without any intention of fulfilling the same."
Therefore, the intention of the accused at the time when the promise was made becomes extremely important. If a person genuinely intended to marry but later the relationship failed because of changed circumstances, family opposition, incompatibility or other reasons, that situation cannot automatically be equated with a promise which was false from its very beginning.
This distinction also prevents Section 69 from becoming a provision where every unsuccessful relationship is converted into a criminal case.
THE KUMAR RISHIRAJ CASE
In Kumar Rishiraj v. State of Bihar, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 61025 of 2023, decided on 20 January 2025, the Patna High Court considered allegations of rape, cheating and related offences. The complainant and the petitioner had become acquainted while working in Bihar and their physical relationship continued from around 2015 for several years. The allegation was that the petitioner had established the physical relationship on the pretext of marriage and later refused to marry her.
The Court noticed several circumstances surrounding the relationship. According to the material before the Court, the relationship had continued for almost seven years and there had been no insistence on marriage during that period. The Court also noted that the complainant was an educated woman and was working as a constable in the Bihar Police. The petitioner argued that she was already married and had a child, and this fact was not effectively denied before the Court.
Considering the overall circumstances, the Court held that the relationship appeared to be consensual rather than one based on a false promise of marriage. It consequently quashed the FIR and the criminal proceedings registered under Sections 376, 420, 406, 120-B and 34 of the IPC.
The reasoning is particularly relevant because the Court observed that the long continuation of a physical relationship without protest or insistence for marriage may, depending on the facts, indicate a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on a false promise.
However, this principle should not be understood to mean that a woman loses the right to complain merely because a relationship lasted for a long time. The facts of every case must be examined individually. Duration is one circumstance; it is not by itself a conclusive test.
FALSE PROMISE AND MERE BREACH OF PROMISE
The Supreme Court's decision in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, remains an important foundation in this area. The Supreme Court distinguished between a false promise and a genuine promise which is subsequently broken. It held that for a promise to amount to a false promise, the maker must have had no intention of fulfilling it at the time it was made. There must also be a direct connection between the false promise and the woman's decision to engage in sexual relations.
This principle becomes particularly important under Section 69 because the statutory language itself focuses on the absence of intention to fulfil the promise.
For example, if A promises B that he will marry her and genuinely intends to do so, but later the marriage becomes impossible because of serious family disputes or other circumstances, the later failure does not automatically prove that A was dishonest at the beginning.
On the other hand, if A never intended to marry B but deliberately made the promise only to obtain sexual relations, the situation is fundamentally different. In such a case, the promise may constitute the deceit contemplated by Section 69.
Therefore, the law must distinguish between:
False promise: Promise made without intention to fulfil it from the beginning.
Breach of promise: Genuine promise which is later not fulfilled.
This distinction is the heart of Section 69.
WHY THE DURATION OF A RELATIONSHIP MATTERS
The Kumar Rishiraj decision gives importance to the duration of the relationship. The Court observed that where a physical relationship continues for a prolonged period without protest or insistence regarding marriage, it may become difficult to conclude that every instance of sexual intercourse occurred only because of a false promise of marriage.
This reasoning is important but should be applied carefully.
A long relationship does not automatically establish consent in every situation. Similarly, a short relationship does not automatically establish deception. The Court must examine the conduct of both parties, the circumstances surrounding the promise, communications between them, the timing of the promise, and the reason for the eventual breakdown.
The real question should therefore be:
Was the promise of marriage the reason for obtaining sexual consent, and was that promise false from the beginning?
If the answer cannot be established merely from the later failure of the relationship, criminal liability should not automatically follow.
EMERGING JUDICIAL APPROACH UNDER SECTION 69
Since the BNS came into force, High Courts have started dealing directly with Section 69.
In Chandra Pratap Shakya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided on 5 February 2026, the Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed proceedings where the circumstances did not prima facie show that the promise of marriage was false from the beginning. The Court treated the later failure of the relationship as insufficient, by itself, to establish the offence.
A different approach was visible in Raju v. State of Madhya Pradesh, decided on 10 February 2026. At the stage of considering the challenge to the FIR, the Court found that the allegations raised questions requiring evidence, including whether the promise was false from inception and whether sexual relations were induced by that promise. Therefore, the proceedings were not quashed at that preliminary stage. This shows that Section 69 is not being interpreted as an automatic offence merely because a marriage did not take
place. At the same time, courts are also cautious about terminating proceedings where the allegations, if proved, may disclose deliberate deception.
A recent example is Atul Kumar Ekka v. State of Chhattisgarh, decided on 30 April 2026. The case directly involved Section 69 and allegations concerning a seven-year love relationship in which the complainant alleged that sexual relations had taken place on an assurance of marriage. The High Court declined to quash the proceedings at that stage, noting the material collected during investigation and the fact that the matter had already proceeded to cognizance and framing of charges.
This case is significant because it shows that a long relationship does not automatically result in quashing. The surrounding evidence and procedural stage of the case remain important.
THE QUESTION OF A MARRIED PERSON
Another difficult issue arises when one of the parties is already married.
A recent Allahabad High Court judgment delivered on 13 January 2026 considered Section 69 in a case where the accused was allegedly already married and therefore, according to the prosecution, could not genuinely have intended to marry the complainant. The Court observed that Section 69 draws a distinction between a false promise made from the beginning and a promise subsequently broken. It also noted that whether the complainant knew about the accused's existing marriage was a matter requiring evidence.
This situation demonstrates why Section 69 requires a fact-based approach. If a person knows that he cannot legally or realistically marry but nevertheless deliberately represents otherwise to obtain sexual relations, the circumstances may support an allegation of deceit. But if the complainant was fully aware of the person's marital status and still voluntarily continued the relationship, the question of whether there was deception directly connected to consent becomes more complicated.
Thus, marital status is relevant, but it cannot be treated as an automatic answer in every case.
BALANCING WOMEN'S PROTECTION AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
Section 69 serves an important purpose. It recognises that deception can be used to obtain sexual relations and provides a separate criminal remedy where the conduct does not amount to rape. This gives legal protection against deliberate exploitation through false promises.
At the same time, criminal law carries serious consequences. An allegation under Section 69 can result in arrest, investigation, trial and social consequences. Therefore, the provision should not be interpreted in a manner where every relationship that ends without marriage becomes criminal.
The reasoning in Kumar Rishiraj is useful in highlighting this concern. The Patna High Court cautioned against converting long-term relationships into criminal cases merely because the relationship later turned sour.
The better approach is therefore neither to reject every complaint nor to presume criminality from every broken promise. Courts should examine the complete circumstances and determine whether the promise was actually deceptive at the time it was made.
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES IN PROVING SECTION 69
One of the biggest difficulties under Section 69 will be proving the intention of the accused at the beginning of the relationship. Intention is generally a matter of the mind and cannot be directly seen. Courts therefore have to infer it from surrounding circumstances. Evidence may include messages, conversations, conduct of the parties, discussions about marriage, engagement ceremonies, attempts to meet families, financial transactions, concealment of marital status and the circumstances in which the relationship ended.
The timing of the refusal to marry can also be relevant. A person who refuses marriage almost immediately after obtaining sexual relations may present a different factual situation from a person who remains in a relationship for several years while repeatedly discussing marriage.
However, no single factor should become a fixed rule. A woman may remain in a relationship for a long period because of emotional attachment, social circumstances or continued assurances of marriage. Therefore, duration should be considered along with the entire factual background.
WAY FORWARD
The emerging judicial approach suggests that Section 69 should be applied through a careful factual inquiry.
First, courts should identify whether there was actually a promise of marriage.
Second, they should examine whether the accused had the intention to fulfil that promise when it was made.
Third, courts should determine whether the promise had a direct connection with the woman's decision to engage in sexual relations.
Fourth, the subsequent conduct of the parties should be considered to understand whether the relationship was consensual or whether it was based on continuing deception.
Finally, courts should maintain a distinction between a false promise and a failed promise.
This approach can protect genuine victims of deception while also preventing criminal law from being used to criminalise every failed relationship.
CONCLUSION
Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita marks an important development in Indian criminal law by specifically addressing sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or a promise of marriage made without intention to fulfil it. However, its application requires a careful balance between protection from deception and protection against the unnecessary criminalisation of consensual relationships.
Kumar Rishiraj v. State of Bihar is particularly useful in understanding this balance. Although it was decided under the IPC and not Section 69 BNS, the case highlights an important principle: a prolonged relationship cannot automatically be transformed into criminality merely because marriage ultimately did not take place.
The later Section 69 cases show that courts are continuing to develop this principle. A long relationship may be relevant, but it is not conclusive. Similarly, a broken promise is not automatically a false promise.
Ultimately, the decisive question under Section 69 should remain whether the promise was dishonest from the beginning and whether that deception directly induced the sexual relationship. This fact-sensitive approach can ensure that Section 69 remains a genuine protection against sexual exploitation without turning every failed relationship into a criminal offence.
References
1. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s 69.
2. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608.
3. Kumar Rishiraj v The State of Bihar, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 61025 of 2023, decided 20 January 2025.
4. Chandra Pratap Shakya v State of Madhya Pradesh, decided 5 February 2026.
5. Raju v State of Madhya Pradesh, decided 10 February 2026.
6. Atul Kumar Ekka v State of Chhattisgarh, decided 30 April 2026.
7. Allahabad High Court judgment concerning Section 69 and a promise of marriage by an already-married accused, delivered 13 January 2026
8.India Code, The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, available at https://indiacode.gov.in
9.Indian Kanoon, Case Law Database, available at https://indiankanoon.org/
10.eCourts India, Judicial Case Records, available at https://ecourtsindia.com/
11.Bureau of Police Research & Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, available at https://bprd.nic.in/